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The Institutions Curse: A Comparative Case Study of Natural Resources in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire
Type of Session
Individual Paper Presentation
Abstract
When a state discovers an abundance of natural resources that can be used as a source of revenue, it would seem like a cure-all blessing, but most actually see it as a curse. Why? Because, on the surface, states that benefit from natural resource wealth seem to have a negative relationship with democracy and democratic institutions. There are others who have disproved the natural resource curse theory by taking a closer look at the causes of the aforementioned relationship and not just the presence of it. The most comprehensive rebuttal of the argument is Victor Menaldo’s institutions curse in which he posits that the institutions in place at the time of the discovery of the natural resource determines the state’s capacity to handle the influx of wealth. In a comparative case study, Menaldo’s argument can be examined with two West African states that have benefitted from oil: Senegal and Cotê d’Ivoire. While the two have many similarities, there is one significant difference: the natural resource revenue has been properly handled in Senegal, but has not in Cotê d’Ivoire. This is attributed to the institutions in each state and their capability to properly and fairly handle the capital. This paper will compare the two cases in order to strengthen the institutions curse argument and advocate that natural resources can be a blessing if handled properly.