2015 Conference

Full Presentation Panel

Energy Democracy in America? Competing Imaginaries of Sustainable Energy Transitions

James E. Wilcox

Energy Democracy is an emerging discourse that offers an alternative vision of energy systems governance and operation that challenges the existing paradigm of centralized generation and oversight. In this paper, I draw on three years of empirical research in New York and concepts from the field of Science and Technology Studies to map the conceptual, political, and infrastructural terrain in which nascent calls for energy democracy are situated. I trace the emergence of energy democracy discourses in New York; explore how questions of social and environmental justice are framed and addressed in energy democracy initiatives; and identify tensions between a focus on 'procedural' and 'operational' energy democracy. I argue that innovation in institutional designs and hybrid forms of expertise are needed to advance energy democracy from discursive to material reality

Sustainability: Global Population, Wealth Distribution, & Energy

Dr. John Wickham

“Sustainability creates and maintains the conditions under which humans and nature can exist in productive harmony that permits fulfilling the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations.” (EPA)

This EPA definition raises several questions: 1) what are the social and economic requirements of the global population - how should wealth be distributed? 2) what are the energy requirements for an economically sustainable world by 2100? 3) Can nuclear and renewable energy replace fossil fuels to avoid disastrous climate change?

The existing global population is projected to reach ~11 billion by 2100. Currently, differences in standard of living are extreme: 8% of the global population owns 79% of the wealth while 68% owns 4.2%. At present, we do not live in an economically sustainable world.

If the developing countries attain the standard of living of the developed countries, it will take a lot of energy. The existing population of developing countries needs 6 times their present energy consumption to attain the standard of living of the developed world.

Where will the energy come from as the global population increases to 11 billion? The traditional energy resources (nuclear and fossil fuels) can supply that energy through 2100 at the expense of climate change and nuclear security. Investment in renewable energy does not come close to meeting the energy needs of a sustainable world by 2100. Currently, we invest about $200 billion/year in renewables. To meet the energy demands of a sustainable population in 2100, we need an annual investment of $1 trillion/year starting today.

Without significantly reducing global wealth inequality and greenhouse gasses, increasing global population and climate change is like a slow-motion train wreck that will crush humans in the lifetime of our children and grandchildren.

Revisiting the Democratic Case for Environmental Offset Markets

Devin Judge-Lord

In their influential 1988 article “Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives” Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stewart proposed wider use of environmental offset markets, not just because economists hypothesized it would be more efficient regulation, but because these two prominent legal scholars hypothesized it would be good for democratic discourse. This article reviews Ackerman and Stewart’s proposal in light of decades of experience with these ideas—from SO2 trading to wetland banking to carbon, habitat, and water quality credits. It finds that, in retrospect, offset markets did not unfold as Ackerman and Stewart suggested and that we may still be looking in the wrong places for opportunities for public participation. An overview of the development of eight different kinds of markets supports two arguments about broadening participation in offset market design. First, instead of focusing democratic engagement on the cap and leaving the trading rules to technical experts, evidence suggests instead focusing on participation in making the rules of trading and leaving numerical caps to experts. Second, because caps can be seen as subsidiary functions of larger landscape and economic planning, stakeholder engagement in planning can offer indirect democratic accountability to caps. Additionally, by examining 48 cases of water quality trading programs in the U.S., this article identifies characteristics of offset markets that might affect participation in market design.